Statewide referenda for land conservation are likely to entail a disparity between people who vote on the referenda and those who live in proximity to conserved areas, which may lead to a lower probability of passage than a more local referendum. This paper examines trends in voting preferences on statewide land conservation referenda in Rhode Island using precinct-level voting data. We identify two similar referenda in 2004 and 2012 and estimate a first difference spatial regression model that seeks to understand the determinants of changes in support over time. Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and political ideology, we find that referenda support is growing in densely populated communities relative to sparse ones, and there is a multiplicative effect of rapidly growing dense areas. This implies urban areas are becoming critical supporters for the preservation of farm, forest and open space lands, despite being nonproximate to lands at risk of development.
Introduction
The last century of population movement in the United States is generally characterized as first moving from rural to urban areas and then moving from urban to suburban areas -the latter generating urban sprawl. Sprawl development has serious negative economic, societal and environmental impacts, including increased congestion, pollution, and decreased access to farmland, forests and open space (Burchell et al. 2002) . Society has begun to take action to combat sprawl and protect open space access through private initiatives as well as policies at all levels of government. One increasingly popular way to preserve open space is public referenda.
These referenda typically raise funds through bonds or increased property taxes that can be used for acquisition of property or development rights. Nationwide, the number of referenda per year has increased from just 26 in 1988 to a peak of 215 in 2004, with over 75% of them passing (Trust for Public Land, 2013) . In fact, by 2004 more money was allocated to land conservation through referenda than federal spending (Nelson et al. 2007) . 1 Intuition would suggest that a likely factor in determining support for land conservation referenda is the distribution of costs of sprawl and benefits of conserved open space. Indeed, prior research has shown that proximity is a key factor. Geoghegan et al. (1997) and Irwin (2002) find that property values increase with the proportion of open space within a given radius of a property. Tyrväinen and Miettinen (2000) find that property values decrease with increasing distance from forested areas.
2 For the cost of sprawl, the literature is also consistent in showing that most costs are born at the local rather than in the broader region. For example Bruekner (2000) and Deal and Schunk (2004) note that infrastructure costs appear to be born at the 1 Open space conservation referenda can take on a number of forms. They vary by the type of land being conserved, ranging from farmland, forestland and wetlands to recreational spaces such as public parks and marinas. They also vary by type of legislation. Some measures are for land acquisition. Others are to continue protection of existing land, while many (including most of the measures in Rhode Island) set up funds to finance future conservation measures. The methods of finance include bonds, increased property and sales taxes, lottery funds, and royalties from resource extraction. In Rhode Island, state level referenda almost exclusively use bonds. The referenda are held at a variety of jurisdictional levels, ranging from the state level, as studied in this paper, all the way down to the municipal level. According to landvote.org, 2394 measures have been put on the ballot across the country, resulting in approved funding of over $58 billion for land conservation since 1988. Between 1992 and 2001, the federal government spent 22.6 billion dollars on land conservation (Lerner et al. 2007 ) versus 21 billion dollars (Trust for Public Land 2013) from open space referenda. 2 While these papers find houses capitalize open space on a local scale, it is possible or even likely that benefits extend beyond a small radius, which could provide motivation for voters not living in proximity to open space to vote in favor of a statewide referendum. However, even if benefits extend to all areas of a state, we would still expect proximate voters to benefit relatively more and thus to vote yes more often than non-proximate voters, all else equal. municipal level. These results suggest that urban communities may be less impacted by urban sprawl and less willing to support and pay for conservation.
Given the localized accrual of benefits and costs of land use change to areas on the urban- Within this context, we are particularly interested in urban areas, which are unlikely to receive much proximate benefit from conservation, but hold a tremendous voting power and tax base that may be tapped to achieve environmental, economic and societal benefits in other communities. Figure 1 illustrates this puzzle for Rhode Island. The first map shows population density, and the second two maps show conservation spending and acres preserved for years 2000-2015 by funds raised through state level referenda. Together, the maps show an almost inverse relationship between population density and direct benefits from the conservation referenda. On one hand, the lack of conservation in urban areas makes sense given the scarcity of undeveloped land and its cost. But on the other hand, it raises the question of why urbanites would choose to vote in favor of such conservation referenda. One possible explanation is that these are the people that understand scarcity of open space and have a larger willingness to pay for conservation of the land that is left. increasing data availability and GIS tools that research using voting outcomes has become more prevalent. There are essentially two main strands in this literature. The first examines municipalities or counties that hold their own referenda and seeks to model support as a function of population, location and referenda characteristics (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006 , Nelson et al. 2007 , Banzhaf et al. 2010 , Heintzelman et al. 2013 . The second strand uses statewide referenda, partitions the state into areas with known voting outcomes, and examines which population and location characteristics drive support. The seminal work of Deacon and Shapiro (1975) examined two statewide initiatives in California, one that dealt with coastal land conservation, using voting observations at the city level. Similarly, Kline and Wichelns (1994) studied four statewide referenda in Rhode Island using town level data. Wu and Cutter (2011) advance this literature by using data with resolution at the block group level. Population density has mixed effects. Nelson et al. (2007) and Banzhaf et al. (2010) find some evidence that density has a negative effect on support. Heintzelman et al. (2013) find no effect of density. Kotchen and Powers (2006) and Wu and Cutter (2011) both find positive effects of density, and in the latter there is some evidence that the magnitude is growing over time.
Our paper contributes to this rapidly growing literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use panel data on land conservation referenda. A second contribution is our development and illustration of a methodology to match precinct level voting outcomes to census tracts. When using aggregated voting data to estimate individual preferences, it is important to use as fine a scale as possible to avoid bias resulting from the ecological fallacy. Wu and Cutter (2011) and Holian and Kahn (2015) use block group level data, the finest resolution among papers in this literature. However, this data is only available for California, and other studies have relied on observations at the level of town, city or county. Our method enables researchers to use fine scale spatial units for analysis for areas outside of California.
Third, we build on two recent studies by incorporating spatial correlation into our models. Wu and Cutter (2011) and Heintzelman et al. (2013) both use spatial models and find that spatial correlation parameters are significant and their inclusion improves model fit. In our case, not only do we find improvements in model fit, but the estimated coefficients on our key independent variables (density, growth and their interaction) change from statistically insignificant to significant (or vice versa) going from non-spatial to spatial. Thus, a spatial econometric modeling strategy is critical to the conclusions. In order to study how preferences may be changing in urban or growing areas, we wanted to choose a subset of the Rhode Island referenda that fit several criteria. First, we required them to be recent elections because we want to establish current trends. Second, we required the referenda to not be site specific, that is to allow funds to be spent anywhere in the state. Third, we required the referenda to be similar in language, spending amounts, and spending patterns.
Background and Data

Rhode
Fourth, the referenda needed to be held in presidential vote years, so we could control for political ideology, which is often a strong determinant of environmental preferences (Deacon and Shapiro 1975 , Nelson et al. 2007 , Heintzelman et al. 2013 , Holian and Kahn 2015 . We decided and 2012 as our study referenda. 4 We now describe each of these referenda in detail, with information from Ballotpedia.
The short name of the 2004 referendum was "Open Space, Recreation, Bay and Watershed Protection Bonds", which appeared on the ballot. It allowed the state to issue bonds worth no more than $70 million, allocated in the following ways:
• $43 million to open space, farmland preservation, and recreational development
• $19 million to anti-pollution projects and restoration activities benefiting Narragansett
Bay and state watersheds
• $8 million to acquisition of land for groundwater protection and supply
The 2004 referendum passed with 70.8% approval.
The short name of the 2012 referendum was "Issue general obligation bonds (up to $20,000,000) for environmental and recreational purposes", which appeared on the ballot. As made clear in the title, it allowed the state to issue bonds worth no more than $20 million, allocated in the following ways:
• $2.5 million to State Land Acquisition -Open Space
• $4.5 million to Farmland Development Rights
• $2.5 million to Local Land Acquisition Grants
• $4 million to Narragansett Bay and Watershed Restoration
• $5.5 million to Local Recreation Grants
• $1 million to Historic/Passive Parks
The 2012 referendum passed with 69.8% approval.
From the descriptions, it is evident that these two referenda are in large part quite similar.
Further, based on conversations with land trust officials, our impression is that voters viewed these two referenda as very similar. Both referenda devote the largest share of funds towards land conservation. Additional priorities in both years are recreation and water, specifically Narragansett Bay, watersheds and groundwater. However, each of these additional priorities could yield action anywhere in the state, as the Narragansett Bay watershed includes most of the state and recreation can happen anywhere. 5 Groundwater protection is actually more likely to impact rural areas because Providence and surrounding urban areas rely on surface water (the 5 In the introduction, we hypothesize that open space conservation could benefit voters not living in proximity to the open space. We see that this is also true for the secondary proposed actions of the referenda. This is particularly true for recreation spending, for which people may travel from many parts of the state to visit. However, our logic for open space benefits applies here too -while recreation areas/programs may provide benefits for everyone in the state, those living in proximity will benefit more. Tapsuwan et al. (2012) offer empirical support of localized benefits of recreation.
Scituate Reservoir). The only true priority difference between the referenda is the addition of historic/passive parks in 2012, which are more likely to occur in rural areas. Thus, based on the described funding priorities, most action resulting from passage is far more likely to impact rural areas, and based on changes in funding priorities across years, we see no reason why support would increase in urban areas.
Having settled on 2004 and 2012, we gathered precinct level voting data for these referenda from the Rhode Island Board of Elections. Voting outcomes for these referenda form the dependent variable in our analysis. This research seeks to explain changes in voting outcomes across these years, so we need to be able to match the precinct voting data with population and socioeconomic variables. While it may be ideal for the unit of analysis to the precinct, the Rhode Island Board of Elections was unable to provide an outline of the precinct boundaries. However, they were able to provide the address of the polling location for each precinct. Thus, we developed a method to match polling locations with census tracts. Using GIS,
we first geocoded the polling address in order to obtain spatial coordinates of each location.
Second, we created Theissen polygons around each precinct address, essentially creating artificial boundaries that were halfway between each precinct point. Third, the newly created precinct Theissen polygons were clipped such that they never cross municipal boundaries.
Fourth, we calculated the area of overlap between 2000 census tract boundaries and the approximated precinct boundaries. Fifth, for each tract, we calculated the proportion of area comprised of each precinct. Finally, we use the area proportions as weights and take a weighted average of precinct voting outcomes to arrive at an estimated voting outcome for each tract, which is our unit of analysis. 6 Figure 2 illustrates this process with fictitious tracts and precincts.
Density, growth and socioeconomic data
The key independent variables for our analysis are population density and population There were many differences between the elections in 2004 and 2012: presidential candidates (most notably the addition of Barack Obama), local races, and non-environmental referenda. All of these factors could cause changes to who decides to vote, which in turn could bias our findings. In order to mitigate this possibility, we control for the proportion of votes going to the Democrat presidential candidate, voter turnout and the proportion of the tract that is black or Hispanic. The last variable comes from the Census data explained above. We additionally gathered voting outcomes in presidential races and total votes cast at the precinct level to create important control variables. We use votes cast for the two major political parties in the presidential election to form a variable percent Democrat. We divide the total votes cast by total population to get a measure of percent turnout. 7 This process is similar to that used to match precincts to tracts. In GIS, we overlaid census tract 2000 boundaries and Census block 2010 boundaries as shapefiles. Then we used the Tabulate Intersection tool to calculate the area of overlap between boundaries. Then we estimated the population of each tract based on the area weighted average population of the full and partial blocks within it. This estimation strategy assumes homogenous spatial distribution of population within blocks, which is fairly benign given the small scale of blocks. 8 The American Community Survey was downloaded at 2010 Census Block resolution. Similar to the process described for population data, we matched these blocks to Census tract 2000 boundaries to estimate socioeconomic characteristics of each tract in Rhode Island. 9 This will necessarily be an underestimate of voter turnout, as the total population is greater than total eligible voters, but we do not have that data by precinct. We additionally estimated models using voter turnout as the dependent variable to test if selection across elections was an issue. The results suggest that none of the key coefficients (density, growth and their interaction) were significant predictors of turnout, suggesting any selection present in those two elections is not driven by those variables. These results are available by request. 
where is population density of tract i, ℎ is population growth, and is a vector of socioeconomic and voting controls. We not only include growth and population as explanatory variables, but also their interaction because there could be a multiplicative effect (and not just additive) of density and growth. We transform and ℎ into deviation from mean form such that 1 through 3 are interpreted as marginal effects at the mean.
The first difference approach is important because not only does it model trends over time, but it controls for unobservable, time-invariant factors at the tract level. If there are determinants of voting that are unobservable to the researcher and correlated with independent variables, then the resulting coefficients will be biased. However, our model should greatly reduce, if not eliminate, that bias.
While Equation (1) presents the motivation for our analysis, it is just an intermediate step towards our spatial model. It is likely important to control for spatial autocorrelation between the dependent variable (spatial lag) and allow for correlation between the error terms (spatial error).
Spatial dependence will occur if the voting trends of tracts are influenced by the trends in nearby tracts, perhaps due to shared benefits from conservation or campaign efforts by various environmental interest groups. Spatial dependence is accounted for by introducing a spatially lagged dependent variable.
Incorporating spatial error is necessary when error terms of nearby geographic areas are correlated due to unobserved, spatially referenced variables. This correlation violates the assumption of independent error terms necessary for OLS. Spatial error dependence could occur if there are unobserved and correlated attributes of neighboring communities that would lead to an increase or decrease in approval rates for land conservation. It could also occur if the data generating process does not match up with the geographic boundaries used (Bivand et al. 2013 ).
This could be the case here because in many cases votes at the precinct level are divided between adjacent census tracts.
Both a spatial lag and spatial error term are incorporated using a mixed regressive spatial autoregressive model with a spatial autoregressive disturbance (SAC or SARAR). The spatial version of our first difference model is as follows: , where p is the inverse distance weighting power. p>0 ensures that nearby areas are given more weight than those further away. Our main specification uses p=1, similar to Wu and Cutter (2011) and Heintzelman et al. (2013) . Admittedly, the selection of neighbors and the inverse weighting power is somewhat arbitrary. Thus, in the results section, we test the impact of using different spatial weight formulations for both the spatial error and spatial lagged dependent variable, and find that results are nearly identical.
In addition, we estimate a cross sectional regression with the same independent variables as our first difference models. This model serves two purposes, both related to comparisons.
First, all existing literature has examined voter preferences using a cross sectional approach, and thus we can use these results obtained using state level referenda in Rhode Island to those obtained from other states or national level data sets of municipal referenda. Second, we can compare the cross sectional and first difference results to ascertain what additional insights are gleaned by using the first difference model. Our cross sectional model is:
We estimate this equation separately for the 2004 and 2012 election, using density, presidential voting, turnout and socioeconomic data from the respective year as controls. Table 2 presents results from estimating Equation (2), our spatial first difference model. The coefficient on density is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. The results of Column 3 suggest that a 1000 person/sq. mi. increase in population density is associated with a 0.339 percentage point increase in approval. In contrast, the coefficient on growth is never statistically significant and changes signs across specifications, suggesting growth has no effect by itself. However, the coefficient on the density-growth interaction is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. This variable is more difficult to interpret. The coefficient of 0.012 in Column 3 suggests that for tracts with a 1% above average growth rate, the effect of an additional 1000 people/sq. mi. above the mean density increases % approve 0.012 percentage points, which added to the level effect of density yields a total increase of 0.351 percentage points. In general, the positive sign across the columns indicates that the effect of density on voter approval is larger in areas with high population growth.
Results
Spatial first difference model
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10 The Langrage multiplier LM and Global Moran's I tests for spatial autocorrelation indicates that both spatial errors and spatially lagged dependent variables should be accounted for in the first difference model. 11 While we use %approve as our dependent variable, other papers in this literature have used the log odds ratio, which equals log(%approve/(1-%approve)) and is theoretically grounded in the binary choice of individual voters. patterns. This finding stands in contrast to much of the prior literature on the determinants of environmental voting (e.g., Kotchen and Powers 2006, Nelson et al. 2007 ), and it is likely due to our method and data. While there is substantial cross sectional variation in socioeconomic characteristics, which is the variation used in prior work, there is unlikely to be as much time variation, which is the variation we use to identify coefficients. Importantly, the insignificant coefficients do not imply that socioeconomic variables are not determinants of environmental voting patterns. Regardless, the focus of our study is on density and growth, and the socioeconomic variables serve as controls so we can better isolate the impact of the key variables.
In suggests that there is no sorting occurring based on preferences for land conservation. In fact, %
We favor using %approve for ease of interpretation, but for sake of comparison, we present analogous results in the online appendix using log odds as the dependent variable. Results are consistent with Table 2. approve is mean reverting between 2004 and 2012, suggesting a random component to voting outcomes.
The spatial lag and error coefficients, shown at the bottom of the table, are significant in all columns and highly significant in most cases. The magnitude of the spatial lag is fairly consistent across columns, but as more covariates are added it declines to 0.479 in Column 3. On the other hand, the spatial error term grows substantially as covariates are added and equals 0.908 in Column 3. This pattern may indicate that controlling for more variation in changes in % approve with covariates actually allows the spatial structure to take shape.
We turn now to discussing total marginal effects. The total effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable can be divided into a direct effect, in which a change in the variable directly impacts the explanatory variable, and an indirect effect, in which it affects the explanatory variable indirectly by first affecting outcomes in nearby communities. Columns 1-3
of Table 2 are direct effects, which are generated through standard spatial regression techniques.
In Column 4, we report the total effect from the Column 3 specification.
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Examining the results we see that the sign and significance of the total effects are the same as in Column 3, but the magnitude is larger for all coefficients. This makes sense because the spatial lag is positive, so indirect spillovers will have an additive effect. The results suggest that indirect effects are substantial, often being of similar magnitude as the direct effect, which makes the total effect almost double what is in Column 3. Thus, density and its interaction with growth are even larger determinants of changes in % approval when considering spillovers.
Robustness of spatial assumptions
As stated in Section 3, our choice of spatial weights matrices is somewhat arbitrary, and thus it is important to explore different spatial formulations to make sure that results are not significantly altered by the choice of spatial formulation. Table 3 presents results for four alternative sets of assumptions about the structure of the spatial lag and spatial error matrix.
Column 1 replicates the main results shown in Table 2 Column 3 for ease of comparison.
Column 2 is similar to Column 1 but defines the nearest 20 tracts as neighbors for the spatial lag, as opposed to just the nearest 10 as in Column 1. Column 3 defines the nearest 20 tracts as neighbors for both the spatial lag and spatial error. Column 4 returns to the Column 1 definition of neighbors (10 nearest for spatial lag and all tracts for spatial error), but uses and an inverse distance weighting power of two, meaning that the modeled correlation of neighbors decays much quicker with distance. Column 5 uses identical weights matrices for the spatial lag and spatial error, which are constructed as follows: for all tracts find the minimum distance between that tract and a neighbor, then take the maximum of those minimums, then categorize tracts as neighbors if they are within that distance.
The coefficients on density, growth and their interaction are remarkably consistent across columns in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. While the alternative spatial approaches are far from exhaustive, these results suggest that the choice of spatial weights object is not important for our conclusions. One interesting difference between models is that the coefficient on the spatial lag is insignificant for Columns 4 and 5, which indicates that the choice of weights and neighbor objects does have an effect on the estimated degree and type of spatial correlation. Table 4 presents results from estimating Equation (1), the non-spatial version of the first difference model. Three columns are presented that are analogous to Columns 1-3 of Table 2 .
Non-spatial first difference model
Similar to Table 2 , density has a consistently positive and significant effect on the change in %approve. In contrast, however, the interaction between density and growth loses statistical significance as more covariates are added. The coefficient on growth by itself gains statistical significance in the final column.
In sum, comparing Table 4 with Table 2 , we clearly see that spatial modeling is important in this context. Moving from a non-spatial to spatial specification, growth loses significance but the density-growth interaction gains significance. Further, the magnitude of effects grows substantially comparing non-spatial coefficients to the total marginal effects of Table 2 . Thus, some of the findings are different once spatial dependence is accounted for.
Spatial cross sectional model
We additionally estimate cross sectional models for 2004 and 2012, separately, with % approve as the dependent variable in both cases. We do this for two reasons. First, these models are more directly comparable to prior literature. Second, we can compare our cross sectional and first difference results to see what additional information is gleaned from the panel data approach. Table 5 presents results from estimating Equation (3); the same spatial weights matrices are used here as in Table 2 . Column 1 presents estimates of the direct effects for the 2004 referendum, and Column 3 does the same for the 2012 referendum. Columns 2 and 4 give total effects after accounting for the multiplier effect of spatial spillovers.
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The 2004 results indicate that recent population growth is associated with increases in % approve. In both years, density and the interaction of density and growth are insignificant.
Consistent with the growth findings, Nelson et al. (2007) find that recent housing growth is correlated with higher approval of municipal referenda. Nelson et al. (2007) and Kotchen and Powers (2006) also find that density has no effect on voting, though Kotchen and Powers find density actually has a negative effect when just examining Massachusetts and New Jersey towns.
Educational attainment is positively correlated with % approval in both years, which is similar to results found in Nelson et al. (2007) . In 2012, approval is increasing in income;
Kotchen and Powers find similar evidence. Democrat vote is again positively correlated with approval in both years, though substantially more so in 2012. This could be due to differences in candidates or many other differences between these elections. Lastly, the results suggest that larger proportions of the young and old lead to lower approval.
While the results of Table 5 tend to support prior cross sectional findings in the literature, there are considerable differences in the conclusions that can be drawn with these models versus the first difference models of Table 2 . First and foremost, the results are basically inverted for our variables of interest (density, growth and their interaction). In the cross sectional model, growth is the only significant determinant of conservation support, and in the first difference model density and density*growth are both significant. Given these differences in results, it is likely that the cross sectional models would not predict the increase in support in dense areas.
Further, in the cross sectional models, several socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., education, income) are statistically significant, but are insignificant in the first difference model. As discussed in Section 4.1, this could imply that these socioeconomic characteristics are not actually strong drivers of support, but instead are correlated with unobservable determinants of support. However, another interpretation is that there is insufficient within-tract, temporal variation to identify the true impact of these variables.
Conclusion
Measuring preferences for open space is important in order to correct market failures and conserve a socially optimal quantity of open space. One source of revealed preferences is voting outcomes on conservation referenda. This paper builds on prior work and suggests an added dimension to the existing literature by looking at trends in referenda approval over time through a first difference specification. Using this new framework, several key findings emerge.
Population density is consistently tied to increasing levels of support over time, particularly in densely populated communities that are also experiencing growth. In our spatial model, we find statistically significant spatial error and lag coefficients, which indicate that both observed and unobserved spillover effects are occurring between nearby neighborhoods. This could suggest voters forming preferences based on nearby communities' density, growth or open space preservation or exposure to campaign efforts pulling these communities together.
Our findings offer potential policy lessons. The first is to answer the question posed in Further, based purely on anecdotal evidence, many urban areas around the US are becoming more environmentally friendly (e.g., bike lanes, community gardens), so it is entirely plausible that the trend we observe in Rhode Island is happening elsewhere.
While this paper makes several contributions to the literature, the findings also raise gives total effects of each variable based on the estimated direct effect in Column 3 and the estimated spatial lag. Models presented here are SARAR models and use a spatial error and spatially lagged dependent variable term. The spatial lag matrix uses the nearest 10 neighbors and the spatial error matrix uses the entire set of neighbors. In both cases, neighbors are given weights equal to inverse distance (and then row normalized). All models use change in % approve as the dependent variable and include 232 observations at the tract level. Growth is defined as the percent population growth between 2004 and 2012. We transform the variables density and growth into deviation from mean form such that the coefficients give the marginal effect of density (growth) with growth (density) equal to its mean. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. from a separate model. All models use change in % approve as the dependent variable and the full set of independent variables used in Column 3 of Table 2 . Only coefficient estimates of direct effects are reported. Each column varies the spatial dependence assumptions, as described in the row 'Spatial assumptions', where lag and error describe the number of neighbors given positive weight for those two matrices, respectively, and p is the power of the inverse distance weighting. Column 1 is identical to Column 3 of Table 2 . In Column 5, the matrix '1 or more' is constructed as follows: for all tracts, find the minimum distance between that tract and a neighbor, then take the maximum of those minimums, categorize tracts as neighbors if they are within that distance. See Table 2 for more details. from a separate model. All models use change in % approve as the dependent variable and include 232 observations at the tract level. Growth is defined as the percent population growth between 2004 and 2012. We transform the variables density and growth into deviation from mean form such that the coefficients give the marginal effect of density (growth) with growth (density) equal to its mean. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (2012), with population growth measured in the past 10 years. We transform the variables density and growth into deviation from mean form such that the coefficients give the marginal effect of density (growth) with growth (density) equal to its mean. The spatial formulation is identical to the models presented in Table 2 . Column 2 (4) gives total effects of each variable based on the estimated direct effect in Column 1 (3) and the estimated spatial lag. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
